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In the Supreme Court
of the State of Utah
WILFRED A. ROGALSKI,
. Plaintiff and Respondent,

vs.

No. 7982

PHILLIPS PETROLEUM COMPANY,
a corporation,
Defendant and Appellant.

1

BRIEF OF APPELLANT

PRELIMINARY STATEMENT

Defendant appeals from a judgment on a verdict for
$6,212.50 recovered by plaintiff for personal injuries. On Jan!! · uary 18, 1952, plaintiff's employer, Parley Droubay, instructed
:i
plaintiff to drive one of Droubay' s tanker trucks onto a cement
platform on defendant's premises at Woods Cross, Utah, and
to steamclean the undercarriage of said truck. Droubay had
previously been refused permission by defendant's officials
to use cement platform for washing his trucks. Plaintiff alleged
in. his complaint that he and his employer, Droubay, were
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•

"business invitees," although the place where the injury to
plaintiff occurred was entirely outside the area where plaintiff
and his employer transacted any business with defendant.
Defendant by answer denied that plaintiff and his employer were business invitees, and alleged that the injuries were
sustained solely by reason of plaintiff's negligence. The evidence showed that plaintiff operated the steamcleaner, and
directed a charge of steam downward in such a manner that
his vision was completely obscured, and while his vision was
so obscured by the steam by reason of the manner in which
plaintiff operated the equipment, and without turning the
nozzle up or away and without waiting for the steam to clear
away, the plaintiff walked around the front of the truck off
the cement platform, stepped into a tank of caustic soda,
the side of which tank was 14 inches above the level
of the concrete washing platform. Plaintiff suffered chemical
burns to his leg. A lid was and is hinged to the caustic soda
tank, which, when down, covers the tank. The caustic soda
is used by defendant for cleaning certain chemical pump
equipment parts. Plaintiff admitted that at no time did he pay
any attention to said tank, and he made no observations with
respect to it as he drove the truck onto the platform. There
is no evidence as to who raised the cover lid of the tank on
the day in question, and as far as the evidence shows, the only
persons who were around there were plaintiff and his em·
ployee, Parley Droubay.
The trial court refused defendant's request to make the
State Insurance Fund a party to the action, although plaintiff
was paid compensation for the injury. The court excluded
4
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I

evidence of plaintiff's admissions made on deposition which
showed that plaintiff could have seen the tank and avoided
stepping off the platform over into the tank if he had turned
the steam nozzle up instead of downward. The court denied
defendant's motion for a directed verdict of no cause of action.
Such motion 'vas predicated upon the theory that plaintiff
was guilty of negligence which as a matter of law precluded
recovery, for the reason that (a) there was no evidence that
either plaintiff or his employer was a business invitee at the
place on defendant's property where the injury occurred,
(b) there was no evidence that defendant's officers or employees had lifted the lid of the caustic soda tank, and (c)
the evidence conclusively showed that the injury was caused
solely by the reckless conduct of plaintiff in moving toward
the tank when his vision was totally obscured from the steam
by reason of the manner in which plaintiff operated the equipment. The court submitted the case to the jury on plaintiff's
theory that plaintiff was a business guest, and refused to submit
the case to the jury with ~ppropriate instructions as to defendant's theory that plaintiff was not a business invitee on
the premises of defendant where the injury ocurred.
The trial court denied defendant's motion for judgment
in accordance with the motion for directed verdict, and also
the alternative motion for a new trial.

STATEMENT OF FACTS

(a) The place where the injury occurred was not a part
of the premises where plaintiff and his employer were business
invitees.
5
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Phillips Petroleum Company, defendant and appellant,
has a petroleum products loading plant located at the southeast corner of Firth North and Onion Streets in Woods Cross,
Utah. At the west end of the property there is a loading rack
consisting of pumps from which pertoleum products of defendant are diverted into tankers. Plaintiff's employer, Parley
Droubay, was and is an independent business operator engaging in the distribution of Phillips petroleum products, under
an express written contract. Doubray owned tankers, into
which he or his employees loaded Phillips products at the marketing facility.
Several hundred feet to the east of the loading rack i~ a
garage building, part of which was used by defendant, and
other portions were leased to Droubay under written lease,
and another portion was ·leased as a custom garage to one
Mitchell. The premises leased to Droubay are specifically described in the lease. Those leased premises did not include
any portion of the premises where the accident occurred, nor
the loading area where Droubay and his· employees obtained
petroleum products.
The premises where the accident occurred on January 18,
1952, were never included in the lease to Droubay, nor ever used
for loading any petroleum products into Droubay's trucks
or tankers (R. 150). There is no evidence that any business
whatsoever was ever transacted between Droubay and the defendant in that particular area. Adjacent to the portion of the
garage building used by defendant and not leased to others,
there is a cement slab 13 feet 11 inches in width and 51 feet
4 inches in length (R. 101). There is a drain located approxi·
6
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mately in the center of the slab (R. 101). The steam-cleaning
equipment was located on the north wall. On the east of the
concrete slab or platform, there is a large garage door leading
to garage and warehouse facilities of defendant. There was
and is no covering for this concrete washing platform.

t..

On the south of the concrete platform, entirely off such
slab, 2 inches south of the slab, 20 inches from the east wall
of the garage, there was and is a metal tank containing caustic
soda. The tank is 5 feet 11 inches in length, and extends 14%
inches above the level of th concrete slab (R. 38). There was
and is a lid fastened on hinges (R. 65). The cover has always
been down when the vat or tank was not in use, as far as
Droubay had observed (R. 77). The caustic soda is used for
cleaning equipment parts (R. 76). Neither Droubay nor
plaintiff saw any Phillips employees around or near the tank
on January 18, 1952, the date of the accident (R. 77, 108,
114, 172-173).

::

Neither the washing platform nor the adjacent caustic
soda tank has ever been leased to anyone. Droubay had attempted to obtain written permission for the use of the washing
platform, but such use had never been granted (R. 92) . He
did not claim any right to go onto that concrete slab to wash
trucks (R. 87). He had previously ~sked for permission, but
he was "generally just put off" (R. 86). The written agreements he had did not include the right to use said facilities.
,, , None of the company officials had ever authorized him to
utilize the washing facilities and had refused him such right.
Droubay, a former employee of defendant, had washed his
trucks there at times prior to the day in question. He had
7
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"usually checked with the people in the maintenance to see
if they were going to be using it, or if I was going to be in
anybody's way." He had no arrangements for going onto the
slab, and he regarded his use of it as a matter of "neighborly
accommodation (R. 86-87). Permission had neither been
granted nor denied (R. 87). On the day of the accident, he
had no recollection of having made any inquiry of anyone
as to whether defendant would be using the washing platform
(R. 87).

(b) Defendant's employees did not participate rn the
acts which produced the injuries to plaintiff.
By answers to the written interrogatories, plaintiff claif!led
that defendant's alleged negligence consisted of the following:
"14. No warning signs, directions, or instructions
provided; no cover over the vat; vat placed too close
to steam cleaning equipment; no proper protection or
barricades around vat for person working in vicinity;
insufficient visibility provided when steam hose in use."
Plaintiff made no claim that defendant or any of defendant's employees were actively negligent in some manner which
'ontributed to the injury of plaintiff. Plaintiff relied on the
claim that he and his employer were business invitees at the
place where the accident occurred. Plaintiff produced no evidence that the cover lid for the caustic soda tank was raised
by any of defendant's employees on the day of the eccident.
There was no evidence that the tank was in use by defendant
on the day of the plaintiff's injury. In fact, neither Droubay
nor plaintiff noticed any of the defendant's employees in the
immediate vicinity of the concrete platform on January 18,
8
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1952 (R. 77, 108, 114, 172). Neither Droubay nor plaintiff paid any attention to the caustic soda tank, nor made any
observation as to whether the cover lid was up or down at any
time prior to the accident ( R. 114, 160) .

Defendant neither turned on the steam, nor operated
the equipment, nor placed the trailer truck on the washing
platform. Plaintiff himself drove the truck onto the platform.
Plaintiff's employer, Parley Droubay, was the person who
turned on the steam cleaner, placed the soap on it, and placed
the equipment in operation (R. 68-69). Droubay cleaned a
portion of the left side of the undercarriage of the truck,
showing plaintiff how to use the equipment. Droubay then
turned the steam hose over to the plaintiff, leaving plaintiff
entirely alone until after the accident occurred (R. 70-71). ·

(c) Failure to see the caustic soda tank was originally due
to plaintiff's lack of observation of what was clearly visible,
and subsequently due to lack of visibility created by plaintiff.
Plaintiff had never been on the concrete platform prior
to the day of the accident. At the direction of Parley Droubay,
plaintiff drove Truck No. 18 onto the "concrete ramp," keeping it as far from the windows and wall as possible to avoid
splashing the wall and windows with grease and water (R.
124-125). He drove the truck in a position so as to stay on the
slab with the right wheels. At the trial he estimated that he
drove the truck to a point within 3 feet from the garage door
located at the east end of the concrete washing platform,
whereas on deposition he testified the distance was about 6
feet (R. 125, 159). Droubay estimated that the front of the
truck was parallel with the west edge of the caustic soda

9
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tank (R. 102). Droubay estimated that the right wheels of
the truck were about 20 inches north of the south edge of
the concrete slab (R. 102).
Prior to the date of the accident, plaintiff had merely
seen the concrete platform and surroundings from a distance of
about 125 feet (R. 151). No one had ever told him that there
was a caustic soda tank adjacent to the washing platform.
When he drove onto the platform, he did not see the tank.
He testified that "if I had of I wouldn't have paid much attention to it" because "there is always a lot of different tanks
and metal containers they have in this vicinity here" (R. 127).
In examining his own photograph, Exhibit "A," plaintiff admitted that he could see the caustic soda tank, and that the
same was plainly visible in approaching the concrete slab (R.
154) . As he drove onto the concrete platform he was paying
more attention to the left wall and windows. He knew there
were objects to his right, a collection of tanks and high-boys,
but he did not pay too much attention to objects on his right.
He stayed about 5 feet away from the north wall of the building (R. 155). He testified, "I tried to stay as far away from
the building as I could and still clear the objects on the right
hand side and not scrape the fender." He knew he had to
stay away from the objects on the right side to get around
with the steam cleaning equipment (R. 156). The steamcleaner nozzle is about ;. or 4 feet from the end of the hose
to the tip of the nozzle (R. 1)7). There were no objects on
the concrete platform other than the steam-cleaning equip·
ment. He had an unobstructed path when he drove onto the
platform, and he did not have to move any objects (R. '159).
10
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As plaintiff drove onto the platform, he did not observe
whether the lid cover of the caustic soda tank was up or down
(R. 160). He thought there were objects within a foot of the
concrete platform (R. 161), but he admitted that he testified
on deposition that there were no objects on the concrete platform except the steam cleaner, and that the objects such as
barrels which he claimed obstructed his view were 4 or 5
feet away from the concrete paltform (R. 162-163).
Plaintiff got out of the cab, and Parley Droubay showed
him how to steam-dean the undercarriage (R. 164). Plaintiff
then started to use the steam-cleaner. Plaintiff directed the
steam where he wanted it, and moved the nozzle to examine
the part to which he had previously applied the steam (R.
165-166):

"Q. When you started to clean around in the front
.of the truck, how could you tell whether or not the
part you had been cleaning, or the undercarriage had
been sufficiently cleaned?
"A. I knew if I waited a minute the steam would
clear, and put steam on it again and more or less take
it for granted the last dose I had given enough to
have it cleaned.

"Q. As you handled this nozzle you directed this
nozzle to the under-carriage, you turned it to one side,
you turned the steam nozzle away and looked at the
part you were working on?
"A. Some of the time turned it up in the air and
waited for the steam to disappear."
Plaintiff tried "to walk around the side of the truck" as
far as he could get "over by the cab door, to wash the outside
11
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of the right front wheel" when his left foot hit the north wall
of the tank of caustic soda, and he raised his foot up over the
Y.rall and stepped into the tank. The visibility was so poor "on
account of the steam, I never saw, or noticed any vat being
there." He held the steam nozzle "straight in front of me,
to my left, a little," his hand being about 2 feet from the
end of the nozzle. The steam was on the entire period of time
(R. 166-168). The steam was so dense that it was "difficult
to see where I was going, very difficult (R. 166). There was
so much steam coming out in front of the truck that he could
not see. It was so foggy he could not see his hand in front
of his face (R. 13 3) . Explaining how he stepped over the
wall of the caustic soda tank, he testified (R. 168):
"A. I touched it with my foot, and as I sort of
stumbled I tried to raise my foot up, to catch my balance, therefore, I accidentally stepped into the tank,
trying to keep my balance, with my right elbow on the
fender, trying to hold myself as I moved forward."
The trial court denied the defendant's offer to show
that on deposition plaintiff admitted that he could easily see
where he was going if he turned the steam nozzle to one side
and up instead of turning it down (R. 170-172).
Plaintiff admitted that Exhibit 9 as a photograph of a
steam-cleaner nozzle is similar to the one he used (R. 176).
Plaintiff had control over the steam-nozzle the entire time
he was using it (R. 177-178).
When plaintiff stepped into the tank of caustic soda, he
yelled, ran into the wash room and was given assistance by
his employer and taken to the hospital. The court excluded
12
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the offered evidence that he was paid workmen's compensation, and recovered sufficiently to return to work when compensation settlement was made.
Defendant offered evidence showing that Parley Droubay
prior to January 18, 1952, requested written permission to
use the washing rack, and to share the use with defendant;
and that he was advised that the only privileges he had were
those set forth in the \vritten contracts and lease, and that
Lloyd Clyde McDonnell, to whom application was made, was
unable to grant such permission (R. 199-200).
The trial judge declined to hear argument on the motion
for .dismissal or the motion for directed verdict of no cause
of action, and submitted the case to the jury.

STATEMENT OF POINTS RELIED ON FOR REVERSAL
OF THE JUDGMENT
1. The case should not have been submitted to the jury,

for defendant violated no duty of care to plaintiff.
2. Plaintiff was guilty of negligence as a matter of law
which would preclude recovery in any event.

3. The court erred in the exclusion of evidence.
4. The court erred in its charge to the jury, by erroneous
instructions and by refusal to submit instructions on defendant's
theory.
5. The State Insurance Fund was a necessary party.

13
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ARGUMENT
POINT NO. I
THE CASE SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN SUBMITTED
TO- THE JURY, FOR DEFENDANT VIOLATED NO
DUTY OF CARE TO PLAINTIFF.
Plaintiff filed suit on the theory that he was a business
invitee on defendant's premises, and that defendant was negligent by failing to keep the premises in a safe condition, particularly by keeping and maintaining a tank of caustic soda
adjacent to a concrete washing platform (R. 1). The defendant denied that plaintiff was a business invitee on the particular premises where the accident occurred, and the evidence
shows that the place where plaintiff's employer transacted
business with the defendant by loading petroleum products
into trucks and tankers is an area at least 100 feet from the
concrete platform and 150 feet from the caustic tank south
of that platform. As pointed out hereinafter in a discussion
of the error in the submission of the case to the jury, the trial
court assumed that if plaintiff was a business invitee on
some portion of the real property of defendant, that business
invitation extended to all of defendant's property.
The place where the injury occurred was at least 150 feet
distant from the eastern portion of the marketing facility: No
petroleum products were loaded by Droubay or his employees
at or adjacent to the place where the injury occurred. Droubay
had a right to use certain portions of the defendant's premises
by express written agreements. He admitted that he claimed
no right to use the washing platform, and that he had made no

14
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arrangements for its use. He had requested written permission from defendant's officials to use the washing platform,
but he was never given such permission-"generally just put
off" (R. 86-87). Droubay washed his trucks once every sixty
days, a,nd it cost him money when he had his trucks washed
at Wagstaff's (R. 108, 92). Droubay never offered to pay
any money for the use of the defendant's washing facilities
(R. 92). He had tried to make some arrangements , for the
use of said washing platform and a grease rack, but permission had never been granted (R. 92) . Before using the
washing platform, he generally asked someone in the maintenance department of defendant corporation whether defendant would be using it of if he would be in the way (R. 86).
He regarded the matter of using those facilities as a matter
of neighborly accommodation (R. 87). On the day of the
· accident he did not recall having asked anyone about it (R. 87).
There is not a scintilla of evidence that Droubay was
invited to use the washing platform and the steam-cleaning
equipment, either by implication or otherwise. Plaintiff was
not a business invitee of defendant. He was an employee of
Drol,lbay. The injury occurred at a place entirely outside
the place where any business was transacted, and more than
150 feet away.
The accident did not occur by reason of some acts of defendant's employees. The plaintiff's employer turned on the
steam-cleaning equipment, and turned the use of it over to
plaintiff after plaintiff had driven the truck onto the cement
platform. Plaintiff paid no attention to his surroundings
other than to observe that there were no employees of defendant
1'5
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around. None of the defendant's employees did any of the acts
which produced the injury. Thre was no active negligence on
the part of defendant, and plaintiff claimed none. The only
negligence claimed by plaintiff on the part of defendant was:
'' 14. No warning sign, directions, or instructions
provided; no cover over the vat; vat placed too close
to steam cleaning equipment; no proper protection or
barricades around vat for person working in vicinity;
insufficient visibility when steam hose in use."
Under plaintiff's theory, defendant had an obligation to
place warning signs, directions or instructions but since plaintiff created so ·much steam-fog by the way he operated the
steam-cleaner, the signs would not have been visible to him
anyway. In view of the admission of plaintiff that even if he
had seen the tank he "wouldn't have paid much attention to
it" (R. 127), it is difficult to see what good such warnings
would have been. Furthermore, there was a lid for the tank.
Obviously it was a lid which could be raised so that the tank
could be used by defendant. The claim that defendant ·failed
to provide a cover is not supported by the evidence, for the
proof shows there was always a cover lid attached to the tank.
The proof is also that the cover-lid was down when not in
use, as far as Droubay was able to observe (R. 77). There
is no proof whatsoever, that any of defendant's employees
raised the cover lid of the tank on the day of the accident.
In fact, when Droubay and plaintiff came onto the washing
platform, they did not pay any attention to the tank and did
not observe whether the lid was up or down (R. 114. 127,

160). Neither Droubay nor plaintiff saw any employees of the
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defendant working in that immediate vicinity on the day of
the accident (R. 77, 108, 114, 172-173).
The claim that the caustic soda tank was "too close to
the steam-cleaning equipment" is patently absurd, for it was
entirely off the concrete platform in a position where defendant could use it. It was not located where it would obstruct
movement on the concrete platform. In fact, there were no
obstructions of any kind on the platform. Likewise, the contention that defendant was negligent by not having "proper
protection or barricades around the vat for persons working
in the vicinity," is also unsound; for if the tank had been barricaded sufficiently to keep plaintiff from stepping into the
tank, the plaintiff would likely have suffered a worse injury
by running into the barricade while moving around in· a fog
of steam which he had created by his own reckless indifference
for his own safety. It would be utterly impossible to have insured the safety of plaintiff under the circumstances.
Furthermore, the claim that defendant was negligent because of "insufficient visibility when steam hose in use," disregards the fact that plaintiff's employer turned on the steam,
and plaintiff created the condition of lack of sufficient visibility of which he complains. All of the conditions of alleged
invisibility were due solely to the affirmative acts and omissions of the plaintiff. He had control of the situation, whether
there would be a cloud of steam in front of him or not. There
is nothing in the record which even hints that defendant knew
that plaintiff was present at the place in question.

If plaintiff was not a trespasser, at best he was a mere
licensee. He was on the portion of defendant's property to
17
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do a job for his employer, Parley Droubay. He was in no sense
a business invitee on either the washing platform of defendant,
nor in the caustic soda tank.
The development of the distinction in liability of a pos·
sessor of land toward a business invitee and bare licensee and
a trespasser is discussed in the Annotation 49 A.L.R. 778
and supplemented at 156 A.L.R. 1226. The terminology used
in the A.L.R. Annotation is "active negligence" in the liability
toward licensees and trespassers and "passive negligence" in
the case of business invitees. An application of the distinction
is Morrison v. ·Rutledge Co., (1922) 20 App. Div. 636, 193
N.Y. Supp. 428, where the evidence showed that the defendant
discharged the plaintiff but plaintiff was permitted to remain
in the hotel for the night. On the following morning she fell
and suffered injuries because of a cake of soap on a stairway.
She fell on her way to get utensils belonging to her and used
by her in her work. The court said:
"Assuming that she was a licensee, then this defendant owed to her the duty not to injure her by an
active negligence. This court so held in the case of
Lande v. L. & S. Constr. Co. (1920) 191 App. Div.
497, 181 N. Y. Supp. 493, and the same rule has
been stated in the court of appeals in the case of Walsh
v. Fritchburg R. Co. ( 1895) 145 N.Y. 306, 27 L.R.A.
724, 45 Am. St. Rep. 615, 39 N.E. 1068. As to a trespaser or licensee, the defendant owed no active vigilance, nor was the defendant liable for any passive
negligence in failing to keep the premises in good repair; but for active negligence the defendant was
liable under the authorities cited.''
In Weitzmann v. A. L. Barber Asphalt Co. (1908), 190
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N.Y. 452, 123 Am. St. Rep. 560, 83 N.E. 477, plaintiff was
injured by a barrel attached to a cable. The trial court had
charged the jury that the barrel was more in the nature of a
projectile fired from a gun or instrument which suddenly shot
across the premises, than where there was a stationary danger.
The Appellate Court said in reversing a judgment for the
plaintiff:
"The defendant had the undoubted right to maintain the apparatus in question on its property, and
while it was probably much more dangerous than stationary machinery, we do not think that circumstance
altered the rule with respect to its liability towards mere
trespassers or bare licensees. As to such persons the
well-settled rule is that the only duty of the owners
or occupiers of the land is to abstain from inflicting
intentional, wanton, or wilful injuries."
In Rosado v. Perch Realty Corporation ( 1933), 239 App.
Div. 373, 267 N.Y. Supp. 561, the court stated:
"It is the etsablished law in this state that the only
duty owed to a mere licensee by the owner of the
premises upon which he is injured is to refrain from
inflicting intentional, wanton, or wilful injury. In
short, in order to render the owner liable for injuries
sustained by. a bare licensee as the result of a defect
in the premises where he was in jured, there must be
some act of active negligence on the part of the owner.
The owner cannot be held liabile in damages for failure to keep its premises in repair."

The same doctrine was applied in Paquet v. Barker ( 193·7)
250 App. Div. 771, 293 N.Y. Supp. 983, where the court said:
"As a matter of law the deceased was either a trespasser or a bare licensee. If he was a trespasser, the
19
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appellant owed to him no duty except that of refraining from intentionally or wantonly injuring him; if
he was a bare licensee, the appellant owed him no duty
to exercise care that the premises were safe for the
licensee, who, in entering by permission, took the risk
of their condition. To such licensee, however, the appellant owed the duty of refraining from affirmative
acts of negligence that might injure the former."
And in Dunn v. Bomberger ( 1938) 213 N.C. 172, 195
S.E. 364, the court said:
"The only duty resting upon the defendant was to
refrain from wilful or wanton negligence, and from the
commission of any act which would increase the hazard. The owner of land is not required to keep his
premises in a suitable or safe condition for those who
come there solely as licensees and who are not either
expressly invited to enter or induced to come upon them
for the purpose for which the premises are appropriated
and occupied. In authoritative decisions of this and
other jurisdictions, the degree of care to be exercised
by the owner of premises toward a person coming upon
the premises as a bare or permissive licensee for his
own convenience is to refrain from wilful or wanton
negligence and from doing any act which increases
the hazard to the licensee while he is upon the premises. The owner is not liable for injuries resulting to
a licensee from defects, obstacles, or pitfalls upon the
premises, unless the owner is affirmatively and actively
negligent in respect to such defect, obstacle, or pitfall
while the licensee is upon his premises, resulting in
increased hazard and danger to the licensee." (Emphasis ours) .
The Restatement makes the same distinction. (Restatement on Torts, Volume II, § 342, is as follows:
20
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"A possessor of land owes to a gratuitous licensee
no duty to prepare a safe place for the licensee's reception or to inspect the land to discover possible or
even probable dangers.
"If the license is gratuitous, the privilege to enter
is a gift and the licensee, as the recipient thereof, is
entitled to expect nothing more than a disclosure of
the conditions which he will meet if he acts upon the
license and enters, in so far as those conditions are
known to the giver of the privilege." (Emphasis ours.)

In the case at bar no invitation was issued to the plaintiff. The sole business of the plaintiff upon defendant's premises was his own and that of his employer. There was no evidence from which the jury could conclude that plaintiff was
a business invitee within the meaning of the Authorities. Defendant owed no duty to plaintiff except to disclose to him any
known defects or dangerous conditions. There was no evidence to the effect that any employe or official of the defendant
corporation had any knowledge that the lid was not on the
vat, nor was there any evidence to the effect that any employe
or official knew or had reason to believe that plaintiff was
going to enter the premises to use the wash rack upon the day
of the accident.
It is respectfully submitted that the court erred in failing
to grant defendant's motion to dismiss on the ground that
no negligence or other breach of duty toward plaintiff was
shown and that the court erred further in permitting the jury
to conclude that the plaintiff was a business invitee upon defendant's premises.

21
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

POINT NO.2
PLAINTIFF WAS GUILTY OF NEGLIGENCE AS A
MATTER OF LAW WHICH WOULD PRECLUDE RECOVERY IN ANY·EVENT.
Defendant did not turn on the steam which blinded
plaintiff, nor did it do anything to obscure his view. Plaintiff's
employer turned on the steam, and plaintiff had control of the
steam nozzle, and he created the steam cloud of which he
complains. He had a clear view of the entire cement platform
as he drove the truck onto it. There were no obstructions. He
could have seen the tank of caustic soda if he had looked. He
said he would not have paid much attention to it even if he
had seen it because of other metal tanks and barrels (R. 127).
His failure to see was due to his own indisposition to look at
what was plainly visible, as shown by Exhibit "A." Exhibits
"B," "C," and "D" clearly show that the tank was in a position
entirely off the concrete platform. It did not obstruct movement on the platform.
Plaintiff testified that he stepped over the side of the
metal tank, which side is 14 inches above the concrete slab,
and into the tank, because he cauld not see where he was going.
The only reason he could not see was because he held the
steam nozzle out in front of him, and downward. The steam
fog was of his own creation. The steam was so dense that he
could not see his hand in front of his face (R. 133). Yet, he
tried to move around the front of the truck blindly. He was
reckless in holding the steam hose in front and downward,
which obscured his view of what was in front of him. He could
22
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have turned the nozzle up or to one side and thus have permitted the steam to float away and to see where the steam
cloud had been. He had sole control of the direction of the
steam, and it was within his own power to wait until the
steam cleared so that he could see (R. 132, 133, 165-166). He
testified that as he came across the front axle and started
to clean on the right side, he started over toward the door and
to walk around the fender when his foot came in contact with
the metal tank which was not visible to him because of the
steam. In trying to get his balance he placed his arm on the
fender, and stepped over into the tank with his left foot (R.
131-133, 164-168, 177-178).
There was nothing which could have prevented seeing the
tank except the steam fog which he created. He wilfully went
forward knowing he could not see, and knowing also that he
could see if he would turn the nozzle up and to one side. He
was wantonly reckless in failing to follow a few simple rules
of care for his own safety.
As a matter of law plaintiff was negligent in failing to
see the vat, or if he saw it he was negligent in stumbling into
it. It is clear that he was negligent in using the steam hose
in such a manner as prevented him from seemg what was
plain to be seen. If he did not see the vat but stepped in a
direction where he had no visibility, being unacquainted with
the premises, his negligence consisted of failing to exercise
ordinary precautions for his own safety in walking into an
area without knowing that it was reasonably safe.
Taking a degree of care beyond any duty owed plaintiff
by defendant a number of cases have held that a business
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invitee walking into a portion of the premises with which he is
not familiar, without endeavoring to ascertain the existence
of defects in the premises, or other dangerous conditions which
he may encounter beyond the door, is guilty of contributory
negligence as a matter of law.
In Tutwiler v. Beverally Nalle, Inc., ( 1943·) 152 Fla.
479, 12 So. (2d) 163, plaintiff was a prospective tenant inspecting the premises in an apartment house owned by defendant. A stairway was constructed to the left of the hallway,
which led from the living room of the apartment to the
kitchen, with a door beneath the stairway. The door opened
unwarningly upon a flight of stairs to the cellar. The floor
level of the hall did not extend beyond the door, there being
a stone drop from the level of the passageway or hall to the
first step of the stairway. The stairway was dark, precipitous
and unlighted. There was evidence that the door had the appearance of an entrance into a closet rather than an entrance
into a cellar. Plaintiff had no knowledge of the condition of
the apartment: She opened the door and fell down the stairway
into the cellar. The court held that plaintiff was guilty of contributory negligence as a matter of law. When she opened
the door to the cellar and was unable to see what was beyond
she failed to exercise ordinary care for her own safety by
taking a step forward into a dark and unlighted stairway.
In Bruce v. Risley, ( 1936) 15 Cal. App. (2d) 659, 59
P. (2d) 847, plaintiff was a prospective tenant. The accident
occured in substantially the same manner as in Tutwiler v. T.
Beverally Nalle, Inc. Plaintiff and another man proceeded to
the rear of the room, opened up a door which led to a base24
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ment stairway platform and plaintiff proceeded along the
platform, striking paper matches to light his way. Plaintiff
fell down the steps into the basement. The court stated that
the impenetrable darkness which surrounded the stair landing was of itself a sufficient warning to plaintiff that if he
proceeded through the doorway without sufficient light to
enable him to see what lay beyond he would do so at his
own risk.
In Murphy v. Cohen, ( 1916) 223 Mass. 54, 111 N. E.
771, plaintiff, a real estate agent, was showing a prospective
tenant through the house and fell on unfamiliar cellar steps
so dimly lighted that the width of the treads was scarcely
visible. The court held that he was negligent as a matter of
law in proceeding into an unlighted area. The New York
court held in Van Ness v. Murphy, {1907} 56 Misc. 556,
107 N.Y. Supp. 99, that plaintiff was guilty of contributory
negligence as a matter of law, when she had recently rented
an apartment and entered a dark hallway, deliberately opened
and walked through the first door she saw without ascertaining that the doorway entered into a stairway to the cellar.
The court said that there was no presumption that a person
can walk through any door he comes to in a strange house
without taking precautionary measures, and in Rowell vs. John
Huztler Lumber Co., {1930} 228 App. Div. 158, 239 N. Y.
Supp. 192, affirmed 1930, 255 N.Y. 581, 175 N.E. 322, plaintiff,
a prospective purchaser, opened and passed through a door
marked "Private." The door opened from the staircase and
the stairs were in complete darkness. The court said "She
was not precipitated down the stairs by anything giving way;
She intentionally pushed the door open, knowing that it
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swung away from her; she then voluntarily stepped into an
unknown space in a strange building without taking any precaution for her safety." Substantially the same factual situation
existed in Boyce v. Brewington (1945) 49 N. Mex. 107, 158
P. (2d) 124, 163 A.L.R. 583. The court stated the rule with
respect to the duty owed a business invitee. It concluded that:
"The failure of the plaintiff to exercise ordinary case for her
own safety when opening a closed door and taking a step forward into an unlighted stairway, thereby contributing to her
own injury as a matter of law, will preclude recovery on her part
under the evidence in this case, and it was error for the trial
court to refuse to direct a verdict in favor of the defendant."
The same rule frequently has been applied where the
plaintiff was a guest, or prospective guest, of a hotel or a
tenant of an apartment house, other than a dwelling place.
In Hooker v. Route Realty Co., (1938) 102 Colo. 8, 76 P.
(2d) 431, plaintiff was attempting to make a social call on
a friend who was a resident of a hotel. Instead of entering the
front entrance plaintiff chose a dark, dingy area, unfamiliar
to her, located in the rear of the hotel. In Hart v. Sullivan,
(1944), 323 Ill. App. 243, 58 N.E. (2d) 301, plaintiff proceeded up an unlighted stairway to meet someone who occupied
an apartment in the building. The only light was a match
plaintiff was using and it was extinguished before he reached
the stairway landing. Plaintiff opened the door leading off the
landing and fell down another stairway leading to the basement. He was held to have been contributorily negligent as a
matter of law. In Campbell v.Abbott (1900), 176 Mass. 246,57
N.E. 462, plaintiff had never before been in the building. He
entered without knocking or ringing a bell and found himself
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in darkness. Instead of attempting to attract attention from
the family he endeavored to find his own way. In so doing
he fell down the cellar steps. The Massachusetts Supreme
Court held he was negligent as a matter of law. The same
rule was applied in Freirson v. Mutual Realty Co. ( 1934), 48
Ga. App. 839, 174 S.E. 144, and in Baumler v. Wilm, (1910)
136 App. Div. 857, 122 N.Y. Supp. 98. Hilsenbeck v. Guhring,
(1892) 131 N.Y. 674, 30 N.E. 580, applied the same rule to
substantially similar facts. Plaintiff had never before been
in the apartment house. He opened a door believing he was
entering a closet but in fact he entered a short dark hallway
leading to the basement. Plaintiff had testified that ··it was
dark and after he got hold of the door in question it was so
dark he could not see in the space in front of him. He had
never been there before, and he had no information which
might lead him or cause him to think there was but one and
that the door led into the closet. He knew nothing about it
and in that state of ignorance he opens the door which he
thought was the one leading to the closet, but, it being dark,
he could not be certain, and, notwithstanding the darkness,
he walks ahead and, while supposing himself in the closet,
steps into the heading of the stairway and falls down the
cellar stairs." The court said that the plaintiff could not walk
through a door in darkness into a hallway with which he
was unfamiliar and then claim damages for the resulting
injury.
To the same effect see Sauter v. Hinde, (1913) 183 Ill.
App. 413; Benton v. Watson, ( 1919) 231 Mass. 582, 121
N.E. 399; DuRocher v. Teutonia Motor Car Co. (1925), 188
Wis. 208, 205 N.W. 921, 42 A.L.R. 1094; National Refining
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Co. v. Strichmaker, (1934) 49 Ohio App. 467, 197 N.E.
364; Heidenrich v. Dumas, (1937) 88 N.H. 453, 190 Atl.
705; Wesbrock v. Colby, bzc., (1942) 315 Ill. App. 494,
43 N.E. (2d) 405; Sat'tori v. Capitol City Lodge (1942), 212
Minn. 538, 4 N.W. (2d) 339; Hudson v. Church of Holy
Trinity (1929), 250 N.Y. 513, 199 N.E. 603; McVeagh v.
Bass (1933) 110 Pa. Sup. Ct. 379, 171 Atl. 486; Brusseau
v. Selmo '(1938) 286 Mich. 171, 281 N.W. 580.

In Erickson v. McKay (1932) 207 Wis. 497, 242 N.W.
133, plaintiff went around to the rear of the building in an
area which he had never been before and fell into a ramp
leading down into the basement. He was held to be contributorily negligent as a matter of law. In Plahn v. Masonic Hall
Bldg. Assn. (1939) 206 Minn. 232, 288 N.W. 575, the court
placed emphasis upon the fact that plaintiff knew, or should
have realized, the risks which she took in walking into an
unlighted area through a door which entered into a stairway
which led to the cellar. Plaintiff here was in search of a toilet
and the court held that she appreciated the risks involved
and that her lack of knowledge of the area exposed plaintiff
to danger.
In Illinois Central Railroad Co. v. Sanderson ( 1917) 175
Ky. 11, 192 S.W. 869, L.R.A. 1917D 890, the Court of Appeals
of Kentucky applied the rule, although plaintiff had been in
the area where the accident occurred before three times, plaintiff in this case hurriedly purchased a railroad ticket and proceeded through a partially opened and unmarked door in the
waiting room. The court stated in its opinion that to bolt
headlong into a dark and unknown place, without stopping
28
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to determine whether it is safe to proceed, is an act of recklessness about which reasonable minds could not well differ.
The trial court should have directed a verdict for defendant.
The rule was applied in England in Wilkinson v. Frairrie
(1862), 9 Jur. N.S. 280, where the opinion was written by
Justice C. B. Pollock.
The same rule has been applied where the plaintiff fell
into a furnace pit or other depression rather than down stairways. Huyink v. Hart Publications (1942), 212 Minn. 87, 2
N.W. (2d) 552; Wentink v. Traphagen (1940) 138 Neb.
41, 291 N.W. 884; Czesznek v. Rulfy Corporation (1940)
259 App. Div. 302, 19 N.Y. Supp. (2d) 248; Gasch v. Rounds
( 1916) 93 Wash. 317, 160 P. 962; Donaldson v. Kemper,
152 Kan. 533, 106 P. (2d) 1051.
In Ross v. Becklenberg ( 1917}, 209 Ill. App. 144 and
DeGralfenried v. Wallace (1899), 2 Ind. Ter. 657, 53 S.W.
452, plaintiffs had entered into unfinished buildings which
were unlighted and in which they had never previously been.
They were held contributorily negligent as a matter of law
when they fell through unfinished floors. In both instances
the courts considered plaintiffs to be business invitees. In
the latter case plaintiff was an attorney who went on to the
premises to interview his client.
The rule was applied in the following cases where the
plaintiffs walked into dark areas and fell into a hole in the
ground or passageway. Powers v. Raymond, ( 1925), 197 Cal.
126, 239 P. 1069; Gillespie v. John W. Ferguson & Co.,
(1909) 78 N.J.L. 470, 74 Atl. 460; Costello v. Farmers Bank,
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133, plaintiff went around to the rear of the building in an
area which he had never been before and fell into a ramp
leading down into the basement. He was held to be contributorily negligent as a matter of law. In Plahn v. Masonic Hall
Bldg. Assn. (1939) 206 Minn. 232, 288 N.W. 575, the court
placed emphasis upon the fact that plaintiff knew, or should
have realized, the risks which she took in walking into an
unlighted area through a door which entered into a stairway
which led to the cellar. Plaintiff here was in search of a toilet
and the court held that she appreciated the risks involved
and that her lack of knowledge of the area exposed plaintiff
to danger.
In Illinois Central Railroad Co. v. Sanderson ( 1917) 175
Ky. 11, 192 S.W. 869, L.R.A. 19170 890, the Court of Appeals
of Kentucky applied the rule, although plaintiff had been in
the area where the accident occurred before three times, plaintiff in this case hurriedly purchased a railroad ticket and proceeded through a partially opened and unmarked door in the
waiting room. The court stated in its opinion that to bolt
headlong into a dark and unknown place, without stopping
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The trial court should have directed a verdict for defendant.
The rule was applied in England in Wilkinson v. Frairrie
(1862), 9 Jur. N.S. 280, ·where the opinion was written by
Justice C. B. Pollock.
The same rule has been applied where the plaintiff fell
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( 1916) 93 Wash. 317, 160 P. 962; Donaldson v. Kemper,
152 Kan. 533, 106 P. (2d) 1051.
In Ross v. Becklenberg ( 1917), 209 Ill. App. 144 and
DeGraffenried v. Wallace (1899), 2 Ind. Ter. 657, 53 S.W.
452, plaintiffs had entered into unfinished buildings which
were unlighted and in which they had never previously been.
They were held contributorily negligent as a matter of law
when they fell through unfinished floors. In both instances
the courts considered plaintiffs to be business invitees. In
the latter case plaintiff was an attorney who went on to the
premises to interview his client.
The rule was applied in the following cases where the
plaintiffs walked into dark areas and fell into a hole in the
ground or passageway. Powers v. Raymond, ( 1925), 197 Cal.
126, 239 P. 1069; Gillespie v. John W. Ferguson & Co.,
(1909) 78 N.J.L. 470, 74 Atl. 460; Costello v. Farmers Bank,
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( 1916) 34 N.D. 131; 157 N.W. 982; Dacus v. Dickinson
T,-ust Co. (1941), 65 Ga. App. 872, 16 S.E. (2d) 786.
In at least two cases plaintiffs were invitees in a garage
or filling station and were held to be contributorily negligent
in walking through darkness and falling into grease pits.
Elliott v. Dahl, ( 1941), 299 Mich. 380, 300 N.W. 1~2; Smith
v. Wiley-Hall Motors (1945) 184 Va. 50, 34 S.E. (2d) 233.
The Court's attention is invited to the Annotation appearing in 163 A.L.R., beginning at page 593, where these and
many other cases are discussed. At page 613 of the Annotation
the editor distinguishes the cases that hold that contributory
negligence is a question for the jury in situations where plaintiff had some knowledge of the premises or the accident
occurred in a place where the injured person possibly had
some right to assume that are area was safe or that the injured
person relied upon the advice or direction of an employe on
the premises, or that there was not sufficient opportunity to
discover the danger prior to the accident.
The case of Moore v. Miles ( 1945) 108 Utah 167, 158
P. (2d) 676, is not contrary on its facts to the principle announced in the cases following the majority rule. In the Moore
case the plaintiff testified that the west end of the hall was
so dark that she could not see the stairs. She said she was walking slowly and feeling ahead with her feet that she lost her
balance at the first step and fell down the short flight of steps
to the doorway. The night clerk testified that the hallway
was lighted and that when he stood at the east end of the
hall he could see the entire length and could see the rooms
all the way down the hall. The court said:
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"This conflict in the evi~ence presented a question
for the jury as to whether the hallway was ·lighted, an
important element on the question of negligence.
Olson v. Hayden Holding Company, 92 Utah 551, 70

P. (2d) 463."
The court held that where reasonable minds could draw different conclusions from the evidence the question of contribu- ·
tory negligence was for the jury.
In the case at bar there is no question of inadequate
lighting. The statute referred to in Moot"e v. Miles is, of
course, inapplicable here. Conceding that this Court is committed to the doctrine that questions of p.egligence and contributory negligence allegedly are to be decided by the jury
under proper instructions, it is respectfully submitted that
reasonable minds could not conclude that plaintiff Rogalski
was free ·from contributory negligence.
It must be kept in mind that the accident occurred in the
middle of the day. The vat into which plaintiff stumbled was
not hidden. It was not placed in a position where its detection
would be difficult. It was in plain view. It was placed in a
position off the cement apron, in an area which would normally
not be frequented by any persons except employees of the defendant and persons who had specific permission to enter the
premises.
Would this Court say that if a man closed his eyes and
walked into the side of the building that he was not guilty
of contributory negligence as a matter of law? Where then
will the Court draw the line? It it less negligent to stumble
into a vat in a refinery area than to walk into the side of a
building? Certainly, the plaintiff had no excuse for not seeing
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the vat. He simply failed to look and observe what was in
plain view. If a man is contributorily negligent as a matter
of law for proceeding into an area insufficiently lighted, then
a fortiori plaintiff is negligent as a matter of law when he
stumbles into a vat which is in plain view in the middle of
the afternoon. This is not a case where plaintiff used a defective appliance or where he stepped on a covering which was
not strong enough to hold his weight. It is to be noted that
the plaintiff alleges that defendant was negligent because of
"insufficient visibility provided when steam hose in use" (R.
14) . Plaintiff himself held the steam hose in such a manner
that according to his testimony his vision was obscured. The
steam which he himself operated and over which he
exercised dominion, prevented him from seeing the vat. Can
this Court say that when plaintiff himself, by his own negligence, makes it impossible to see the vat, he is less guilty of
contributory negligence than if he actually closed his eyes
and walked into it?
Moreover, plaintiff was not in the kind of an area in
which he could reasonably expect to be free from danger.
He was near a gasoline refinery, an area in which there are
bound to be some dangerous tools and substances. It does
not matter, for the purpose of considering plaintiff's negligence, whether the content of the vat was water, gasoline,
caustic soda or any other substance. Plaintiff is not entitled
to presume, in the kind of an area in which he was working,
that any substance in the vat was safe to step into. There is
no evidence as to what his thoughts were on this subject in
any event, because he did see the vat before he stepped into it.
Certainly this Court cannot say that if he had seen the vat he
32
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would have stepped into it on a cold day in January, on the
assumption that its contents were not harmful to him.
It is respectfully submitted that the trial court erred m
failing to grant defendant's motion for a directed verdict
and in failing to enter a judgment of non-suit at the close of
plaintiff's evidence.
The case at bar is substantially identical with the case
of Knox v. Snow, et al., recently decided by this court. Knox
t'. Snow, et al, ( 1951) ____ Utah ____ , 229 P. (2d) 874.
The
plaintiff in that case was a customer in a service station. Upon
his own initiative, and without any invitation or direction
from the defendant, he walked through the repair shop looking for an innerliner for a tire. In the language of the Court:
"As he walked across the shop he stepped over a
hydraulic hoist, which extended about eight inches
above the floor, and which was a few feet from the
grease pit, and continued on toward the tire rack. Upon
approaching the rack he stopped, his left foot resting
on or near the rim of the pit. After standing there a
moment, he shifted his weight from one foot to another, and in doing so, his left foot slipped, he lost
his balance, and fell into the well."
The Court assumed, for the purpose of argument, original
negligence by the defendant and assumed further that plaintiff was a business invitee. The Court then held, squarely affirming the trial judge, that plaintiff was guilty of contributory
negligence as a matter of law. The language of Mr. Justice
Latimer is quoted for the convenience of the Court:
"Assuming that the service room was somewhat
shaded as plaintiff claims, such a circumstance would
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not relieve him from maintammg some reasonable
lookout along the path he was to travel. Such a condition might require that he be more alert. He was
el).tering a shop which was used for servicing motor
vehicles. From his previous experiences and observations of similar shops .where motor vehicles are serviced, he could reasonably be charged with knowledge
that some of the equipment in the shop would present hazards to one paying no attention to the obstacles across the course to be taken. Furthermore,
the evidence establishes that he knew. the path he was
taking was· not free and clear as while proceeding
across the room toward the rack he stepped over both
beams of a hydraulic hoist which was in his pathway
and he maneuvered his way around cans and other
debris on the ·floor of the shop. In spite of knowing
the probability of other obstacles blocking his course
plaintiff continued forward without seeing the cement
border around the pit, the grease pit, or the ladder
which was protruding prominently from the pit. The
hydraulic hoist was located about nine feet from the
pit, and the grease and oil cans were between the
hoist and the pit. These obstructions compelled plaintiff to pay some heed to the floor of the shop and the
path he travelled as he crossed the service room in
order to avoid tripping over them.
"When he approached the point where he claims
he could more closely examine the tires on the rack,
the ladder which extended up from the pit was almost
within his reach; the cement border was large enough
to be easily observed; and the merest glance towards
the floor as he moved forward would have disclosed
the presence of the danger. It seems unbelievable that
plaintiff could have been so unobservant as to miss
seeing the pit as he testified he stood right at its edge
and upon shifting his weight from one foot to the
other he lost his balance and fell into the excavation.
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"Plaintiff seeks to justify his failure to observe the
danger which was clearly visible because his sole interest was in the tire on the rack;· that he didn't see
the ladder or the pit because he wasn't looking at
the floor or wasn't watching where he was stepping
because his interest was centered solely on the tire
rack; and that if he had looked he would probably
have seen the protruding ladder and the pit. It thus
becomes apparent that this is not a case where plaintiff
used reasonable care for his own safety. A reasonable
person makes some observations along the path he
chooses to follow. In this instance plaintiff was so
intent upon observing the articles on the rack that he
neglected to use the care required of a prudent man
traversing a shop having hazards readily discernable,
even to one with impaired vision." (Emphasis applied.)
In the case at bar plaintiff did not even have the excuse
that the area was shaded, nor did he have the excuse that
there was a possible defect in his vision. Applying the tests
of Raymond v. Union Pacific Railroad Company (1948), 113
Utah 26, 191 P. (2d) 137, it is clear that in any reasonable
view of the evidence a jury could not find that plaintiff was
free of contributory negligence. It is respectfully submitted
that the trial court erred in failing to grant defendant's motion
for a directed verdict and in failing to enter a judgment of
non-suit at the close of plaintiff's evidence.

POINT NO.3
THE COURT ERRED IN EXCLUDING EVIDENCE.
The plaintiff attempted to escape the consequences of his
own negligence by claiming ignorance of his surroundings,
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and unfamiliarity with those surroundings. The proof showed
that any ignorance of what was within plain sight was due
to his unwillingness to look, and his indisposition to take the
ordinary care that common sense would require a person to
exercise. Plaintiff's deposition was taken prior to trial, and
he gave a different version of how some of the events had
occurred.
When confronted with his deposition for the purpose of
showing the admissions of plaintiff that he could have easily
avoided the accident, counsel for the plaintiff objected to
reading certain portions to him, and the court sustained the
objections without knowing the content. Consequently, in the
absence of the jury, defendant made a proffer of proof to show
not only some inconsistency, but the admissions of plaintiff
(R. 170-172):

"Q. But, as you turned the nozzle away from that
particular part, you could see whether it was cleaned,
or needed the fl.pplication of further steam?
MR. McCARTHY: Your Honor, I object to the
whole line of questioning, Your Honor, it is repetition, and not in any way contradictory to anything the
witness testified to.
THE COURT: The objection is sustained.
MR. REIMANN: Then we would like to make a
tender of this testimony on the deposition.
THE COURT: You may make the tender after the
jury is gone.
MR. REIMANN: The tender we wish to make is
page 35 of the deposition of Mr. Rogalski.
THE COURT: The court, ladies and gentlemen, will
.~ (,
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be in recess until 2 P.M. (Thereupon the jury is admonished and excused until 2 o'clock P.M.)
These proceedings were had during the absence of the jury:
MR. REIMANN: May we make the tender in the
record? The defendant makes the following tender
of proof from the deposition of the plaintiff on page
35, lines 4 to 9 inclusive:

"Q. But, as you turned the nozzle away from that
particular part, you could see whether it was cleaned,
or needed the application of further steam?
"A. After I took the nozzle away and raised it up in
the air, I would wait a short while till the steam disappeared, then I could see if I was cleaning it fairly
good."
The defendant further tenders proof on page 3 5 of the
deposition, lines 15 to 26 inclusive:

"Q. And you had the nozzle and the steam running
slightly downward, did you not?
"A.

Yes, sir.

"Q. You did not put the hose up so you could see
where you were going ?
"A. I had it my my left, and down. I was following
right along the fender. The fender was right by my hip,
I cold feel my fender right there.

"Q. You could have seen rather easily if you had
turned the steam upwards, turned the nozzle upwards,
you could have seen the fender without difficulty, could
you not?
"A. Yes, I suppose I could have." (Italics added.)
The defendant also makes a tender of evidence from the
deposition on page 35, lines 27 to 30:
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"Q. · You could have seen all of your surroundings,
too, without difficulty, if you had turned the steam hose
up instead of turning it down?
"A. I would probably have had to raise it away over
my head."
Each of said tenders is made to show admissions on the
part of plaintiff, which proximately contributed to his injury,
each of said tenders so shows. Our proof is further made for
the purpose of impeaching the plaintiff with respect to answers
given both on direct examination and on cross-examination.
MR. McCARTHY: I object to it, it is incompetent,
irrelevant and immaterial and not proper material for
impeachment.
THE COURT: The objection is sustained.
As pointed out in 4 Wigmore on _Evidence, § 1048, pages
2-6, the admissions made by a patty out of court are admissible
in evidence. A fortiori, the admissions made under oath are
likewise admissible. The quoted portions of plaintiff's deposition show that plaintiff knew that in order to see where he
was moving, all he had to do was to turn the steam nozzle to
one side and upward instead of down, inasmuch as he had full
control of the nozzle and the course and direction of the steam.
The admissions show conclusively that the condition of lack
of visibility was created solely by plaintiff, not by defendant.
Rule 26 (d) permits the deposition of a party to be used by "an
adverse party for any purpose.''
Independent of the proffered evidence, the defendant was
entitled to have the court grant the motion for a directed verdict of no cause of action. When the court committed the further error of submitting the case to the jury, under erroneous
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instructions, the exclusion of such proffered evidence became
all the more prejudicial; for the admissions clearly show that
plaintiff knew how he could have assured himself sufficient
visibility and that the lack of it depended solely on himself.
POINT NO.4
THE COURT ERRED IN ITS CHARGE TO THE JURY,
BY ERRONEOUS INSTRUCTIONS AND BY REFUSAL TO
SUBMIT INSTRUCTIONS ON DEFENDANT'S THEORY.
It was defendant's theory at the trial of this cause that
plaintiff had no permission, either express or implied, to use
the steam cleaning equipment upon the day of the accident.
Defendant expressly denied any negligence and denied expressly that plaintiff and his employer were business invitees
on the premises (R. 16). The evidence supporting defendant's
theory was to the effect that the agreements between Droubay,
plaintiff's employer, and defendant was the lease dated March
1, 1949 and the consignment agreement dated February 25,
1949 (Exhibits 2 and 8). In neither of these agreements is
Droubay given any permission to use any portion of Phillips'
property except the area referred to on Exhibit 1 as "The
Droubay office" and the area referred to as the "truck pumps."
Droubay had requested permission to use the steam equipment
and the wash rack but that he was never given such permission.
He was "generally just put off." According to his own testimony (R. 86, 87) it was customary, before he ever used the
rack on previous occasions to inquire of Phillips' maintenance
foreman whether it would be in use or whether he would be
in the way, but on the day of the accident he has no
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recoll~ction of making such inquiry (R. 87). He claimed no

right to go on to the slab to wash his trucks. His use of the
equipment was "purely a matter of neighborly accommodation."
in the instances where the equipment was used. Droubay had
never offered to pay anyone for the use of the steam cleaning
equipment. When his trucks were washed elsewhere, or when
he used other equipment to wash them he was, of course, required to pay for the service (R. 91, 92).
Defendant requested the Court to give a series of instructions, placing before the jury defendant's theory with respect
to the question of whether plaintiff was a business invitee. Defendant's requested Instruction No. 1 was to the effect that
the jury could find that the plaintiff was a business invitee with
respect to the area adjacent to the gasoline pumps without
being an invitee with respect to the area adjacent to the wash
rack and the wash rack itself.
Defendant's requested Instruction No. 2 was substantially
to the same effect. Defendant's requested Instructions Nos. 3,
4 and 5 were to the effect that if plaintiff and his employer
were not business invitees the defendant owed them no duty
to warn plaintiff of a danger of which defendant had no
knowledge. Defendant's requested Instruction No. 5 incorporates the idea ?f an assumption of risk. Defendant's requested
Instruction No. 6 is a further attempt to enlighten the jury
concerning the liability toward the business invitee. It includes
the idea that a "business invitee may extend to one part of
the premises without extending to all of the premises.''
Defendant's requested Instruction No. 7 was as follows:
"If you find that the plaintiff was merely a licensee upon the
40
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premises of the defendant you are instructed that the only
duty owed to the plaintiff by the defendant was not to unlawfully and wantonly injure him. In the absence of such wilful
and wanton misconduct on the part of the defendant you
must not allow the plaintiff to recover." Defendant's requested
Instruction No. 8 was to the effect that plaintiff could not
have been a business invitee unless he went on the premises
for a purpose mutually beneficial to plaintiff and defendant,
and defendant's requested Instruction No. 9 stated: "A posessor of land owes to a gratuitous licensee no duty to inspect
the land to discover possible or even probable dangers.'' Defendant's requested Instruction No. 10 is to the effect that a
gratuitous licensee is .not entitled to any sP'Xial preparation
of the premises for his safety.
Judge Baker uniformly refused to give in substance or
effect, or at all, defendant's requested Instructions Nos. 1
through 10. Instead the Court's Instructions 10 and 11 were
the only enlightenment received by the jury on the difficult
and technical question of liability of a possessor of land toward
a business invitee, a gratuitous licensee or a trespasser. Instructions 10 and 11 by the Court can be searched in vain for any
distinction in the liability toward these various classes of persons. The entire Instructions only emphasized and reiterated
the special and particular duty toward a business invitee. The
Court did not tell the jury in any manner the distinction between the duty toward a business invitee and a gratuitous
licensee.
Unquestionably, there was evidence from which the jury
could have determined that plaintiff was a gratuitous licensee.
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In fact, the evidence is conclusive to that effect. The jury
might even have determined, under the evidence, that at least
with respect to the day on which the accident occurred plaintiff was a trespasser on the wash rack and in the use of the
steam cleaning equipment. Defendant was entitled to have
its theory of the case presented to the jury. If the actual requested Instructions of the defendant were inadequate for
any reason they at least attempted to present defendant's
theory. The Court's ruling and the Instructions actually given
took from the jury one of the primary issues in the lawsuit.
This Court has clearly held that the duty of a trial court to
instruct the jury on a pertinent theory cannot be avoided because a request fairly calling the attention of the court to the
principle of law may also contain some language in addition
to the statement of the legal principle which may be subject to
criticism. Smith v. Lenzi, 74 Utah 362, 369, 279 P. 893. The
duty of the court to adequately instruct the jury on the theory
of each litigant is so well established in this jurisdiction that
citation of authority is unnecessary. The duty is not discharged
by giving mere abstract statements of law. The court itself is
required to apply the law to the particular facts and to direct
the jury as to the legal effects of particular facts found by it.
Smith v. Cannaday, 45 Utah 521, 529, 147 P. 210.
In the case at bar the trial court refused to discharge this
duty. It is a fair statement that aside from the question of
contributory negligence as a matter of law, defendant's main
theory was that plaintiff was not a business invitee. The special
duty to discover and disclose defects or dangerous conditions
was, therefore, inapplicable. The Court could well have ruled
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that there was no evidence from which the jury could have
found that plaintiff was a business invitee. Certainly, there
was evidence to support a finding that plaintiff was a mere licensee or even a trespasser. The importance of ample instructions with respect to liability in each instance is apparent.
There was ample evidence that plaintiff was not a business
invitee, and that he was a bare licensee if ·not a trespasser
with respect to the portion of the premises where the accident
occurred. The giving of plaintiff's requested instruction No. 4,
whereby the jury might consider the plaintiff a "business visitor"
when there was no such evidence, invited a verdict against
the defendant. The defendant's theory of the evidence was not
presented, for the court refused to give defendan~· s requested
instructions numbered 1 to 12; and the court even failed to define the terms such as "business visitor" and "lic~see," so
that the jury was left without any guide (R. 228-240). The
jury was not instructed on defendant's theory at all, with respect to plaintiff being a trespasser or bare licensee.
As pointed out in Webb v. Snow, 102 Utah 435, 132 P.
2d 114, a party is entitled to have his theory submitted to the
jury, when there is evidence to sustain it. In Pratt v. Utah
Light & Traction Co., 57 Utah 7, 169 P. 868, 869, this Honorable Court declared:
"Each party to a suit is entitled to have his theory,
when there is evidence to sustain it, submitted to the
jury and the judgment of the jury on the facts tending ·
to support such theory assuming always that there is
testimony offered to support the same, and this court
has so held in Hartley v. Salt Lake City, 41 Utah 121,
124 P. 522, where, speaking through Straup, J., it is
said:
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" 'There are two parties to a lawsuit. Each on a submission of the case to the jury is entitled to a submission of it on his theory and the law in respect thereof.
The defendant's theory as to the cause of the accident
is embodied in the proposed requests. There is some
evidence, as we have shown, to render them applicable
to the case. That is not disputed. We think the court's
refusal to charge substantially as requested was error.
That the ruling was prejudicial and works a reversal
of the judgment is self-evident. * * * ' " See also
Morgan v. Bingham Stage Lines Co., 75 Utah 87, 283
P. 160."
If there had been aiiy issue to submit to the jury, the defendant was entitled to have its theory presented in accordance
with proposed instructions 1 to 12 inclusive, or the substance
thereof.
It is respectfully submitted that a trial court's error in giving and failing to give the instructions with respect to defendant's theory of the case is reversible error and requires
fendant' s theory of the case is reversible error and would require
a new trial in the event the cause were not dismissed with

prejudice.

POINT NO.5
THE STATE INSURANCE FUND WAS A NECESSARY PARTY.
The defendant filed a motion to the complaint of the
plaintiff, moving the court to dismiss the action on the grounds
that the State Insurance Fund was a necessary party plaintiff.
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This motion was argued and denied by the court. By answer
the defendant set up the further defense that the cause of
action, if any, was in the State of Utah, or the State Insurance

Fund.
In support of these defenses the defendant offered to
introduce in evidence in the case from plaintiff as witness, the
fact that he had received compensation, the amounts of compensation he had received, and the doctor and hospital bills
that had been paid by the insurance carrier. All of this evidence the court refused to admit. The defendant made a proffer
of proof in this connection which the court denied (R. 205206).
The date of the accident was January, 1952. The statute
covering the wrongful act of third persons was 42-1-58 Utah
Code Ann. ( 1943). This section was a re-enactment of Title
42-1-58, Chapter 65 of the Session Laws of 1945.
The 1945 enactment was a complete revision of the section
covering the death or injury by wrongful act of third persons
which was in effect at the time the Utah Supreme Court issued
its decision in the Johanson v. Cudahy Packing Co. case, 107
Utah 114; 152 P. (2d) 98. This decision was issued October
5, 1944. The 1945 Session Laws re-enacted Sec. 42-1-58, Rev.
Stat. of Utah 1943o.
In the Johanson case the court held the cause of action
of the third party was not assignable under the statutes then
in effect. The court construed the word "subrogation" in this
section as not creating any new cause of action. At page 104
of the Pac. Rep. the court states as follows:
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"The insured who, because of non-payment of the
loss in full retains a portion of the right of action, and
such insurance companies, not only are proper parties
plaintiff but must be joined as such."
Again, at page 105, the court states:
"The only concern of the defendant, third party, is
that he not be sued twice for the same wrong; that is,
that the suit be brought in the name of the real party
in interest and that all persons interested in the litigation be bound by any judgment entered therein. The
failure on the part of plaintiffs to make the insurance
carrier a party plaintiff, or· if it refused to join, make
it a party defendant, is at the most a defect in parties
plaintiff. Such a defect is waived unless raised."
The court goes on to point out that the special demurrer
on the grounds that the plaintiff did not have the capacity to
sue, did not raise the point of a defect of parties plaintiff.
The action of the Utah State Legislature in completely
rewriting the section covering the wrongful act of third persons at the next session of the legislature following the de·
cision in the Ja hanson case must be construed as having had
for its purpose the enacting of a law which would protect the
insurance carrier. There must have been some significance
in changing the word "subrogation" and making the insurance
carrier who had paid compensation the trustee of the cause
of action and then providing that the recovery was to be distributed in accordance with the three items set forth in the
statute. The first two of the schedules for reimbursement provide for the payment of all costs of action, including attorney's fees, which is to be charged proportionately against the
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parties as their interests shall appear; secondly, that the compensation carrier shall be reimbursed in full for all payments
made, and lastly is the provision that any amount over and
above shall go to the employee or his heirs.
This statute in its wording provides that the insurance
carrier is to bring the action though the action may be in
the name of the employee or the insurance carrier. This act
also provides that the insurance carrier can settle and release
the cause of action but can do so only with the consent of the
Commission. Clearly, the objection raised by the motion to
require the Insurance Fund to be joined as a necessary party,
and the defense that the cause of action was in the insurance
carrier, are both valid defenses and should have been sustained
by the court.
It is no answer that the 1945 amendment ( 41-1-58) provides that " * * * the employer or insurance carrier shall become trustee of the cause of action against the third party and
may bring and maintain the action either in its own name or
in the name of the injured employee * * * ." The action in
the case at bar was not brought by the insurance carrier in
the name of the injured employee. It was instead brought by
the employee himself and in his own right.
The record in this case is clear that the complaint was
filed on March 18, 1952 (R. 1-3). Plaintiff sued in his own
·right without reference to the right of the State Insuqmce
Fund. On April 2nd (R. 7) defendant filed its motion to dismiss and to make more certain in which defendant specifically
grounded its motion to dismiss on the fact that plaintiff's injury apparently occurred during the course of his employment;
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that the plaintiff has received compensation" and the insurance
carrier, be it the State of Utah or otherwise, is therefore a
necessary party to this action, or the cause of action, if there
is one, would appear to be in the compensation carrier" (R. 6).
After this motion was filed a letter was sent by the State
Insurance Fund to Dennis McCarthy, in which Mr. McCarthy
was authorized to represent the interest of the State of Utah
"in attempting to procure reimbursement to the fund for the
amounts which the State Insurance Fund has been required
to pay in this case. * * *" (R. 9) . The letter is dated April
8, 1952, and was filed on the same date. At no time after this
fetter was filed was any appearance entered for the State Insurance Fund. There was never any order of Court to the
effect, by implication or otherwise, that plaintiff was suing in
behalf of the Insurance Fund. Certainly the Insurance Fund
was not maintaining this action and did not maintain the action
"in the name of the injured employee." The action had been
filed and defendant's motions served and filed before it appeared to counsel that the State Insurance Fund had an interest
of any kind. The letter of April 8, 1952, ·was an afterthought,
and certainly could not add any right to plaintiff which he did
not have at the time he filed the action.

It is respectf~lly submitted that, particularly in view
of the fact that the Court overruled defendant's motions, there
is nothing in the record in this case to prevent the State Insurance Fund from now maintaining its own separate action
under the statute, either in its own name or in the name of
the injured employee.
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CONCLUSION

Knox v. Snow, ( 1951), ____ Utah ____ , 229, P. 874, establishes the principles applicable in this case with respect
both to negligence and contributory negligence. If anything,
the sole negligence of plaintiff and lack of any negligence
on the part of defendant are more appare~t in the case at
bar than in that case. The Court should reverse the judgment
and dismiss plaintiffs claims with prejudice. There is no
question that inasmuch as defendant's theory of the case was
never presented to the jury by appropriate instructions, and because the instructions given were erroneous and inadequate,
defendant would be entitled to a new trial. If a new trial is
required the Court should order that the State Insurance Fund
be required to enter an appearance or assign its interest to
the plaintiff.
Respectfully submitted,
McKAY, BURTON, ~1cMILLAN & RICHARDS. and
PAUL E. REIMANN
Attorneys for Defendant and Appellant

Received ________________ copies of the foregoing Brief of Appellant
this ________________ day of June, 195 3.

Attorneys for Respondent
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